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Abstract 
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia in 2015, and in 
Woolwich, south-east London where British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby 
was murdered in 2013, there has seen a significant increase in anti-Muslim 
attacks. These incidents have occurred offline where mosques have been 
vandalized, Muslim women have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face 
veil) pulled off, Muslim men have been attacked, and racist graffiti has been 
scrawled against Muslim properties. Concurrently, there has been a spike in 
anti-Muslim hostility online, where Muslims have been targeted by campaigns 
of cyber bullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and threats of offline 
violence. Against this background, we examine the nature and impacts of 
online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We draw on our different 
experiences of conducting research on anti-Muslim hate crime, using two 
independent research projects in order to consider the affinity between online 
and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We argue that, in reality, online/offline 
boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. For victims, it is often 
difficult to isolate the online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse 
that they suffer offline. Moreover, victims often live in fear because of the 
possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’. We conclude that 
there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical 
world, especially in the globalized world. 
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Introduction 
In the current climate, Muslims are increasingly finding themselves under 
siege (Awan 2012a; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2011; Poynting and Perry, 
2007; Poynting and Mason, 2007). Anti-Muslim hate crime has increased 
significantly following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in the UK 
(Byers and Jones, 2007; Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Noble, 2004; 
Poynting and Mason, 2006). More recently, the murder of British Army soldier 
Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013 has fuelled the growth of anti-
Muslim hostility on social media as well as in the streets of Britain. According 
to the Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks project (Tell MAMA, 2014; 2015), there 
has been a significant spike in anti-Muslim attacks, ranging from online 
threats, incitement and harassment to actual physical attacks and arson in 
public. Moreover, the activities of Islamic State militants such as the murder of 
British aid worker David Haines in September 2014 demonize Islam and 
Muslims and as a result, ‘legitimize’ anti-Muslim attacks both online and offline 
(Dodd and Williams, 2014).   
At the same time, certain European countries have applied restrictive 
measures and bans on the practice of Islam in the public sphere. In 2009 
Switzerland banned the construction of new mosque minarets. In 2011 France 
became the first European country to ban the wearing of the face veil in public 
places including public buildings, educational institutions, hospitals and public 
transport. Belgium was the second European country after France to enforce 
a similar ban. In Spain, the city of Barcelona and other regions have brought 
in similar bans, as have some towns in Italy. Similar restrictions have been 
introduced outside of Europe too. In 2011 the Canadian government made it 
illegal for Muslim women to wear a face veil at citizenship ceremonies, while 
in West Australia a law requiring Muslim women to remove their face veil in 
order to prove their identity to police was passed in 2013. In the wake of the 
rise of terrorist group Isis, a number of Australian politicians have called for 
the banning of the face veil in public in New South Wales, Australia on the 
basis that it could be used for the purposes of terrorism (Barker, 2014).   
Seen through the prism of security and risk, Muslims in the West have 
emerged as the new ‘folk devils’ of popular and media imagination (Zempi and 
Chakraborti, 2014). Within this paradigm, Islam is understood as a violent 
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political ideology, religion and culture; Muslim men are perceived as the 
embodiment of terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism; and Muslim women 
are viewed as the personification of gender oppression in Islam, especially if 
they are veiled. Ultimately, such stereotypes provide fertile ground for 
manifestations of offline anti-Muslim hate crime for example, verbal abuse, 
physical assault, and property damage in the public space (Awan, 2012b) as 
well as online anti-Muslim hate crime, for example, via social networking sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter, Bebo and MySpace (Awan, 2014). Specifically, for 
far right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), online activity is 
central to its organizational identity and as such social media sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter are the favored mode of communication between their 
online sympathizers, as it allows them and other groups (such as far-right 
British nationalist political party Britain First) to use them to hold online posts, 
but also to organize offline attacks. Online communicative messages are used 
in order to engage with members as regards offline protests and 
demonstrations which often risk stoking up fear, and promoting anti-Muslim 
hatred and in some cases actual offline violence (Citron, 2014).  
Against this background, we examine the nature and impacts of online 
and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We draw on our different experiences of 
conducting research on anti-Muslim hate crime, using two independent 
research projects in order to consider the affinity between online and offline 
anti-Muslim hate crime. We argue that Muslim women are more vulnerable to 
intimidation, violence and harassment, both online and offline. Also, we 
highlight that individual experiences of online and/or offline anti-Muslim 
hostility increase feelings of insecurity and vulnerability amongst victims, 
thereby diminishing their sense of belonging, confidence and willingness to 
integrate into society. Moreover, we consider the collective impacts 
associated with online/offline anti-Muslim hostility through notions of a 
worldwide, transnational Muslim community, the ‘‘ummah’’, which connects 
Muslims from all over world. We suggest that, in reality, online/offline 
boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. We conclude that for 
victims, it is often difficult to isolate the online threats from the intimidation, 
violence and abuse that they suffer offline. Rather, there is a continuity of anti-
Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in the 
 4 
globalised world. Correspondingly, victims live in fear because of the 
possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’. 
 
Methods 
The findings in this paper are based on two independent research projects 
that we are attempting to bring together in order to compare the relative online 
and offline experiences. Specifically, Awan’s (2014) study examined anti-
Muslim hate crime on Twitter. He analyzed a random sample of 500 tweets 
from 100 different Twitter user profiles, in order to look for patterns emerging 
about Muslim communities on this social media platform. His study analysed 
tweets between January 2013 and April 2014, using the hashtags #Woolwich, 
#Muslim, and #Islam in order to examine patterns emerging regarding online 
anti-Muslim hate crime on Twitter. Hashtags allow an opportunity to use 
specific terms such as Muslim and Islam, as a means to see how Muslims 
were depicted both before and post the Woolwich attack. Indeed, these terms 
had appeared on the Twitter search engine as words that had recently 
“trended” in the United Kingdom (UK). The study used a mixed methodology 
as part of a wider content analysis utilizing qualitative and quantitative data 
gathering techniques embedded within grounded theory.  
The study also included the use of the electronic database NVivo.  By 
using the software system NVivo, Awan (2014) was able to collate and 
identify comments, posts and patterns that emerged through ‘high frequency’ 
words.  The comments and posts investigated were then compiled into a large 
word cloud. The word cloud was analyzed using a word frequency count that 
was created to explore core issues and recurring themes around how Muslims 
were being viewed on social media. All the social media comments were 
imported into NVivo and the author was able to analyze the comments with 
the use of visualization tools such as the NCapture tool, which is a web 
browser extension that allowed the author to quickly and easily capture web 
content via social media data such as Twitter for further analysis.    
Zempi’s (2014) doctoral research took the form of a qualitative study 
based on semi-structured interviews with veiled Muslim women in Leicester 
between 2011 and 2012. Specifically, the study comprised of 60 individual 
interviews and 20 focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women who have 
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been victims of anti-Muslim hostility in public in the UK and elsewhere. 
Individual, in-depth interviews allow for ‘rich’ data to be collected with detailed 
descriptions (Hennink et al., 2011). This approach is especially valuable for 
researching sensitive issues that require confidentiality and a more intimate 
setting for data collection, and this is especially appropriate for ‘hard to 
access’ groups such as veiled Muslim women. Focus group interviews 
incorporate the strengths of qualitative research in terms of gathering ‘rich’ 
data whilst generating additional insights through group interactions (Curtis 
and Curtis, 2011). In the context of this study, the focus group method 
afforded the possibility of open discussion amongst veiled Muslim women with 
similar or different experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime whilst, at the same 
time, highlighting collectively held beliefs and attitudes.  
Prospective participants were identified through local Muslim 
organisations including mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic centres, as well 
as local Muslim university student societies, and Muslim women’s groups. 
Participants unaffiliated to any local Muslim organizations or groups were also 
recruited through snowball sampling. All interviews were anonymised and the 
research participants were given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. At 
the time of the fieldwork, the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study 
were residents living in Leicester. According to the most recent Census data, 
Leicester is a city located at the heart of the East Midlands of England and 
has a population of approximately 330,000 (Office for National Statistics, 
2011). Leicester residents hail from over 50 countries from across the globe, 
making the city one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse places in the 
UK. In view of its diverse mix of cultures and faiths, Leicester is commonly 
depicted as the UK’s most ethnically harmonious city and as a successful 
model of multiculturalism both nationally and internationally. Moreover, 
Leicester has a large and rapidly expanding population of Muslims and niqab-
wearing women, making it an ideal site in which to conduct this particular 
study. 
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Understanding the nature of online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime 
In the British context, a hate crime is any criminal offence which is perceived, 
by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice on 
particular grounds – race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender status and 
disability. Hate crime is not limited to just physical attacks, but includes a wide 
range of potential crimes from offensive graffiti, damage to property, abusive 
and threatening messages, harassment, intimidation and verbal abuse (Perry, 
2001).  Perry (2001: 10) argues that hate crime is about offenders pursuing a 
level of control and power and states that a hate crime must involve “…acts of 
violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatized and 
marginalized groups. As such it is a mechanism of power and oppression, 
intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize a given social 
order...” 
 Within a sociological framework, hate crime is a qualitative distinct form 
of aggression. In essence, hate crime victimisation serves as a visible 
indicator of the motives of the perpetrators. It indicates the perpetrator's bias 
and prejudice, and serves symbolic and instrumental functions for the 
perpetrators. A ‘hate’ message is communicated to a community or group and 
the symbolic status of the victim motivates the perpetrators. It is irrelevant if 
victims actually identify themselves as members of a particular socially 
identifiable group. In the eyes of their perpetrators, they symbolise a despised 
social group. According to Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) recent 
data analysis they found 548 verified incidents (of 729) reported to them 
concerning anti-Muslim abuse. The majority of incidents took place online 
(402 out of 548). Almost, a fifth of service users reported repeat offline 
incidents of anti-Muslim hate with Muslim women suffering more offline 
incidents than men. 
 Anti-Muslim hate crime falls under the category of religious hate crime, 
which is where it is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be 
motivated by hostility or prejudice based upon a person's religion or perceived 
religion (Keats, 2014). According to the Association of Chief Police Officers in 
the UK, online hate crime includes illegal hate content that aims to incite 
hatred based on the grounds of race, religion and sexual orientation.  This 
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could include; words; posts; forums; videos; chatrooms; pictures and 
websites.  The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who are tasked with 
prosecuting people who have committed communication offences via social 
media, argue for there to be an offence of online hatred there must be; (i) A 
credible threat of violence and damage to property; (ii) Communications must 
specifically target an individual or individuals based on harassment; (iii) 
Communications that have breached a court order and (iv) The 
communications must be grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or false.   
 Hall (2013: 5) argues that “These definitions are notable because they 
allow for anyone to be a victim of hate crime, and for any offence or incident 
to be recorded and investigated by the police as a hate crime.”  The UK policy 
and legal interpretation of hate crime has also divided the term into different 
areas from hate motivation, hate incidents, and hate crimes. The operational 
definition in England and Wales states that hate motivation is where “Hate 
crimes and incidents are taken to mean any crime or incident where the 
perpetrator’s hostility or prejudice against an identifiable group of people is a 
factor in determining who is victimized” (College of Policing, 2014: 3).  The 
definition included here is broader in the sense that the victim does not have 
to be a member of a group.    
 A hate incident on the other hand is described as: “Any non-crime 
incident which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated 
by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race, religion 
or perceived religion, sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, 
disability or perceived disability, or transgender or perceived to be 
transgender” (College of Policing, 2014: 3). Hate incidents are important 
because they are defined as particular crimes that can often escalate into 
further crimes or tension in a community. For example, comments made by an 
evangelical Protestant preacher, named Pastor James McConnell who 
described Islam as a ‘heathen’ doctrine and argued that Muslims ‘could not be 
trusted’ were investigated by police as a potential hate incident, because of 
the nature of the comments which were construed as potentially aiding an act 
that could lead to an escalation of violence and community tensions (BBC 
News, 2014). 
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 That stated, it is important to recognise that the visibility of Islam is key 
to revealing the individual’s Muslim identity and thus triggering online and/or 
offline anti-Muslim attacks. Indeed, a key finding that emerges from our case 
studies is that the visibility of victims’ Muslim identity is key to triggering anti-
Muslim attacks, both online and offline. For example, in terms of social 
networking sites individuals might be perceived as ‘Muslim’ because of their 
name, appearance in their profile picture (dress for women and beard for 
men) and comments indicating their affiliation with Islam. With respect to 
public spaces, individuals might be identified as ‘Muslim’ primarily because of 
their appearance, dress and location (for example, attending the mosque). 
Similarly to the virtual world, where actual and potential victims are identified 
through the visibility of their Muslim identity, ‘perceived’ Muslims are equally 
vulnerable to intimidation, violence and abuse on the street. Public visibility is 
a critical element to prejudice given that “perceptible differences are of basic 
importance in distinguishing between out-group and in-group members” 
(Allport, 1979: 132). The power of social perception along with negative 
attributions ascribed to those viewed as visibly different is a key element to 
understanding hate crime in general and anti-Muslim hate crime committed 
against individuals more specifically (Byers and Jones, 2008). Without what 
Allport (1979) refers to as “visible differences” in the form of social dress, 
perceived in-group and out-group membership would not be ascribed. He 
refers to the merging of the “symbol” (e.g., physical and cultural attributes) 
and what the symbol is perceived to stand for (e.g., terrorism, enemy) as 
“condensation” whereby the visible difference and the ascribed meaning given 
to the symbol come together, thus, creating a key element of the necessary 
perceptual formula for prejudice (Jacobs and Potter, 1998: 13).  
 We also found that in addition to the ‘visibility’ of a person’s Muslim 
identity, gender was key to triggering attacks both online and offline. For 
example, Awan (2014) found that the majority of victims of online anti-Muslim 
hate crime were ‘visible’ Muslim women, particularly those wearing the hijab 
or niqab. Similarly, Zempi (2014) found that niqab-wearing women were 
persistent and multiple victims of anti-Muslim hate crime offline. Whilst 
suffering manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility in public, some participants 
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had also suffered persistent online abuse including name-calling, threats to 
physically harm, online stalking and sexual harassment (Zempi, 2014).  
Typically, males are overwhelmingly the victims of hate crime but in the 
case of anti-Muslim hate crime, it is the females who are most often attacked 
(Perry, 2015). This applies to both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime, 
as our case studies demonstrate. As Perry (2014) points out, Muslim women 
are more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hate crime and this is very much in 
contrast to the demographics of hate crime generally, which tend to target 
men disproportionately. Githens-Mazer and Lambert’s (2010) London study 
also found that while racist violence typically targets men, Muslim women are 
more vulnerable to religiously motivated hate crime. Poynting and Noble 
(2004) found that women had experienced racism, abuse or violence since 11 
September 2001 more than men. An Australian Community Relations 
Commission (Dreher, 2006) on post-9/11 experiences of Muslims found that 
50.4% of the victims were female, whereas only 44.4% were male (the 
remainder were institutions/buildings). Abu-Ras and Suarez’s (2009) 
American study of the PTSD effects on Muslims after 9/11 found that a 
significantly larger proportion of women (86.3%) than men (54.9%) had 
experienced hate crime. In light of these findings, it is important to note that in 
comparison to men, women are more visibly identifiable as ‘Muslim’ through 
their dress. Unless they wear the jubba (male Muslim robe), men are not 
easily identifiable as Muslim even if they wear a beard. This indicates that 
Muslim men are less ‘visible’ than Muslim women. 
Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) point out that gender precipitates 
manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility on the basis that the visibility of the 
Muslim veil, coupled with popular perceptions about veiled Muslim women as 
oppressed, dangerous and segregated, mark them as ‘uniquely’ vulnerable to 
online and offline manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility. Perry (2014) argues 
that for veiled Muslim women, the anti-Muslim violence they experience is 
different in its dynamics from that perpetrated against Muslim men. Relatedly, 
Abu-Ras and Suarez (2009: 59) highlight the complexity of these women’s 
identities as follows: (i) their gender status as women, who generally face 
more discrimination in access to educational, financial, health, and social 
resources; (ii) their cultural identity that is shaped by structural social and 
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cultural constraints provided by gender socialization and patriarchal 
processes, that also justify certain types of discrimination; (iii) their status as 
immigrants and minorities in a Western country and the resulting social and 
economic marginalization; (iv) their language barriers, which often result in 
loss of power, influence, and control over their family members; (v) their 
religious identity, which results in their separation from men and the wider 
society; and (vi) their Islamic dress code that symbolizes modesty and 
physical integrity, and identifies them from non-Muslims, marking them as 
targets for hate crimes, discrimination, and possible violations of their bodily 
integrity (Perry, 2014). 
In relation to the motivation of hate crime perpetrators, Perry (2015) 
emphasizes that hate crimes involve acts of violence and intimidation, usually 
directed towards already stigmatized and marginalised groups. As such, it is a 
mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious 
hierarchies that characterize a social order. Participants in Zempi’s (2014) 
study made explicit reference to the type of language used by the 
perpetrators, which signified their motivations for the attack. For example, 
they had been called names such as ‘terrorists’, ‘Muslim bombers’ and 
‘suicide bombers’, which indicate the perpetrators’ perceptions of veiled 
Muslim women as a security or terrorist threat. Awan (2014) found that there 
were a number of terms that were used to describe Muslims in a negative 
manner; these included the words ‘‘Muslim pigs’’ (9%), ‘‘Muzrats’’ (14%), 
‘‘Muslim Paedos’’ (30%), ‘‘Muslim terrorists’’ (22%), ‘‘Muslim scum’’ (15%), 
and ‘‘Pisslam’’ (10%). Tell MAMA (2014) has also examined the use of words 
on social media to describe Muslims from January 2013 to December 2013, 
collating high-frequency words that were directly related to anti-Muslim hate 
and prejudice. They also found the words ‘‘Ninja’’, ‘‘Muzrats’’, and ‘‘Paedo’’ 
being used against Muslims (Tell MAMA, 2014). After examining the 500 
tweets, and looking at the use of language to depict Muslims in a negative 
light, Awan (2014) constructed a typology, consisting of eight different people 
identified as cyber trolls; that is, people who are using social networking sites 
such as Twitter to produce a sustained campaign of hate against Muslims.  
These are the “trawler” (a person who has gone through other people’s 
Twitter accounts to specifically target people with a Muslim connection); the 
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“apprentice” (someone who is fairly new to Twitter but nonetheless has began 
to target people with the help of more experienced online abusers); the 
“disseminator” (someone who has tweeted about and retweeted messages, 
pictures, and documents of online hate which are specifically targeting 
Muslims); the “impersonator” (a person who is using a fake profile, account, 
and images to target individuals); the “accessory” (a person who is joining in 
with other people’s conversations via Twitter to target ‘visible’ Muslims); the 
“reactive” (a person who following a major incident, such as the Woolwich 
attack, will begin an online campaign targeting actual and perceived Muslims); 
the “mover” (someone who regularly changes their Twitter account in order to 
continue targeting someone from a different profile); and finally, the 
“professional” (a person who has a huge number of people following on 
Twitter and regardless of consequences, he/she will launch a major campaign 
of hate against Muslims; this person is also likely to have multiple Twitter 
accounts which are all aimed at targeting Muslims).  
Another key finding that emerges from our case studies is the fact that 
anti-Muslim hate crimes increased both online and offline following ‘trigger’ 
attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who choose to 
identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam. Such 
‘trigger’ attacks include the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and 
the 9/11 terror attack that hit the United States in September 2001 (see also 
Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Mason, 2006). According to Byers 
and Jones (2007) terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have a significant impact on 
the rise of anti-Muslim hate crime.  For them, they act as ‘trigger’ events that 
culminate in the increase of actual changes in social behaviour.  They found 
that anti-Muslim hate crime increased on average from 0.6136 reported per 
week before 9/11 but that increased to 28.44 following 9/11 after spiking to 
nearly 200 reports one single week. Similarly, Poynting and Mason (2006) 
have examined the post 9/11 response towards Muslims in Britain and 
Australia. They found that anti-terror and security policies had in effect 
criminalised Muslims as being ‘‘evil’’ and a ‘‘fifth column’’ enemy, thus creating 
the “othering” of Muslim communities.  They reported how in the immediate 
aftermath of ‘trigger’ events such as 9/11, there was an upsurge in anti-
Muslim hostility. 
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More recently, both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crimes increased 
following terrorist attacks of national significance such as the Woolwich attack 
and terrorist attacks of international significance such as the Charlie Hebdo 
attack in Paris, and attacks in Copenhagen and Tunisia. Hanes and Machin 
(2014) argue that if attitudes toward groups like British Muslims are altered by 
‘trigger’ attacks and by media coverage of attacks, then this reflects the 
proposition of “attitudinal shocks,” where a driver of hate crimes is the level of 
hatred or bigotry for a particular group in society, which may be influenced by 
media framing and coverage of attacks. In this context, shifts in underlying 
bigotry from attitudinal change following events like terrorist attacks seem to 
be potentially important determinants of hate crime incidence.  .    
Spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents following ‘trigger’ 
events are not confided to offline settings; rather, the offline pattern is 
replicated online (Awan, 2014). That said, it is important to note that anti-
Muslim abuse occurring online can be categorized as being “cyber 
harassment,” “cyber bullying,” “cyber abuse,” “cyber incitement/threats,” and 
“cyber hate” (Wall, 2001). Indeed, online offender personality traits seem to 
have been formed from those seeking and searching for an ‘‘identity’’, which 
allows them to use and exploit social and political beliefs as an ideology which 
has no respect for the individuals or groups it targets (Prince, 2012; Lagerlof, 
2004; McKenna and Bargh, 1998; Tajfel, 1970). This therefore can result in 
them trying to use online methods as a means of self-protectionism and false 
patriotism such as far right groups, which are apt at fuelling anti-Muslim 
hostility.  
 Often this is played out by abusive, threatening and coordinated tweets 
or through the use of sites like Facebook to send messages of hate which 
include the use of visual images to target particular individuals and 
communities. Many of the comments posted online through social networking 
sites have an extremist and incendiary undertone (Awan, 2014). Moreover, 
they are not confined to social networking sites but include blogging sites, 
online chat rooms, and other virtual platforms, which have been used to 
promote online cyber hate and anti-Muslim attacks (Allen, 2014), often in the 
form of racist jokes and stereotypical “banter” (Weaver, 2013). As these 
incidents often go unchecked, this type of ‘‘low-level’’ online abuse leads to 
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the normalization of such behaviour and even an escalation to physical 
attacks (Allport, 1954). As Feldman et al. (2013: 11) point out, comparatively 
to offline hate crime ‘much less attention has been paid to online hate crime, 
which can be the precursor to more physically threatening offline incidents’.  
 
Understanding the individual impact of anti-Muslim hostility 
Crime can incur a number of different ‘costs’ following a victimization 
experience that involve emotional, psychological, physical and financial 
liabilities (Waldron, 2012). However, victims who have been targeted on the 
basis of their perceived ‘‘difference’’ and ‘‘otherness’’ are likely to experience 
a host of negative emotions that are qualitatively distinct from those 
experienced following victimization that is not motivated by hate or fear 
towards the ‘‘Other’’. The wider hate crime literature demonstrates a ‘unique’ 
impact associated with targeted victimization (Botcherby et al., 2011; Smith et 
al., 2012; Williams and Tregidga, 2014). In the context of anti-Muslim hate 
crime, both online and offline attacks upon Muslims ‘‘hurt’’ more than ordinary 
crimes as they are seen as an attack upon the victims’ core identity (Zempi 
and Chakraborti, 2014). In this context, the impact of anti-Muslim hate crime 
may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime because of victims’ perceived and actual 
vulnerability due to their affiliation to Islam. 
 A key feature of targeted victimization is that single incidents tend to be 
part of a long-term pattern of victimization, a recurring and, in some cases, 
constant feature of one’s everyday life. From this perspective, anti-Muslim 
hate crime – similar to other forms of hate crime – is not a static problem, but 
instead should be seen as a dynamic social process involving context, 
structure and agency (see also Chakraborti and Zempi, 2012; Bowling, 1999; 
Kelly, 1987). For Rowe (2004), the fact that this victimization is part of the 
routine of the victim’s daily experience makes the abuse more, rather than, 
less serious. From this perspective, online and/or offline anti-Muslim hate 
crime can place a potentially huge emotional burden on actual and potential 
victims. It can damage their sense of belonging, confidence and feelings of 
safety (Bowling, 2009).  
 Given that they are targeted because of the ‘visibility’ of their Muslim 
identity (which is easily identifiable because of their Muslim name and/or 
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Muslim appearance in either the virtual world or the physical sphere), victims 
are unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them was 
simply random and ‘‘could have happened to anyone’’. Rather, they are 
forced to view this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity and this has 
severe implications for the levels of confidence and feelings of security 
(Spalek, 2005). Correspondingly, Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim 
women’s confidence had been severely affected as a result of their recurring 
experiences of online and offline anti-Muslim hostility, as demonstrated in the 
quotes below.  
 
Everyone thinks we are the enemy. I feel that I don’t have the right 
to be here. It crushes my self-esteem. (Parveen) 
 
We feel like social lepers that no one wants to engage with. 
(Maryam) 
 
The threat of anti-Muslim hate crime has long-lasting effects for individual 
victims including making them afraid to leave their homes and feeling like 
social outcasts. Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim women were often 
reluctant to leave the house through fear of being attacked particularly on the 
street, in parks, in shops and on public transport. At the same time though, 
many participants reported feeling like ‘‘prisoners in their own home’’. As the 
following quotations show, negotiations of personal safety can create a sense 
of imprisonment on the basis that they restrict veiled Muslim women’s 
participation in society, despite decreasing exposure to anti-Muslim hostility in 
public.  
 
It stops me from going out. I only go out when it is absolutely 
necessary, for example, to go to the shops or for medical treatment. 
(Latifah) 
 
It feels like we are under house arrest. People have locked us up 
without realising it. (Duniya) 
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People are being hypocritical in their argument that women in niqab 
are oppressed because they oppress us. We are stuck at home all 
day. (Focus group participant) 
 
As Hindelang (2009) points out, for crime to occur the prime actors – the 
offender and the victim – must have the occasion to intersect in time and 
space. By removing themselves from public space, actual and potential 
victims reduce the chances of being subjected to anti-Muslim hostility. 
Accordingly, veiled Muslim women spoke of feeling safe by confining 
themselves to their home as much as possible, with many participants 
explaining that they used the internet to connect with the outside world 
(Zempi, 2014). In this case the home was understood as a retreat from the 
hostility of the outside world and a key source of personal sense of security. 
 However, the fact that women often experienced online abuse indicates 
that they could not feel safe even online. In this regard, the threat of online 
abuse creates social isolation for Muslims who are effectively cut off from their 
online social life because the abuse and harassment they are receiving 
online. For many individuals social media is a lifeline. For example, for those 
with disabilities, life limiting conditions, caring responsibilities, leaving or being 
driven off social media would leave them completely isolated. At the same 
time, participants described living in fear because of the possibility of online 
threats materialising in the ‘real world’ (Zempi, 2014). Therefore, the affinity 
between online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime ‘‘forces’’ some Muslims to 
withdraw from wider social participation, as this might be seen as the ‘‘only 
way’’ to be safe from the threat of anti-Muslim hostility. 
 Furthermore, offline experiences of anti-Muslim hostility coupled with the 
potential for future attacks can affect and sometimes seriously damage the 
quality of life of victims and their families. Zempi (2014) found that on many 
occasions, veiled Muslim women’s children were affected by this victimization, 
especially since they were witnesses of such incidents. For young children, 
witnessing their mother being abused was confusing and extremely upsetting, 
as indicated below. 
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I was on my own with my five year old daughter in London, going to 
get the bus so I was crossing the road. A man in a big car, it was an 
English man in his 50s, pulled down his window and shouted swear 
words. Then my daughter started crying. She kept talking about it 
all day saying ‘‘Why was that man so horrible mummy?’’ (Nadia) 
 
The incident at Sainsbury’s in Leicester [a white English man 
shouted ‘‘Get the fuck out of my country’’], my children witnessed it 
and my younger daughter was very upset because she couldn’t 
understand why it happened. She was like ‘‘Why is he saying that 
mummy? We are British, aren’t we?’’ (Aisha) 
 
Similarly, Awan (2014) found that online anti-Muslim hate had a devastating 
impact upon victims and their families. Clearly, online threatening and abusive 
comments, for example through visual images, fake profiles, Facebook 
messages, online YouTube videos and tweets, can have a detrimental effect 
on the individuals who are targeted as well as their families (Waddington, 
2010). A political director recalls the impact of online anti-Muslim hate 
comments on his family. He stated that:  
 
To say that I find the relentlessly hostile coverage of Islam, coupled 
with the personal abuse that I receive online, depressing is an 
understatement. There have been times – for instance, when I 
found my wife curled up on our couch, in tears, after having 
discovered some of the more monstrous and threatening comments 
on my New Statesman blog – when I've wondered whether it's all 
worth it. 
 
We argue that hate crime, hate incidents and hate speech can have direct 
impacts for individuals, both online and offline. For example, this is particularly 
strong when considering hate speech online that aims to threaten and incite 
violence. Hate speech in this context is any form of language used to depict 
someone in a negative fashion with regards their race, ethnicity, gender, 
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religion, sexual orientation or physical and mental disability with promotes 
hate and incites violence (Yar, 2013). This also links into the convergence of 
emotional distress caused by hate online, the nature of intimidation and 
harassment online, and the prejudice that seeks to defame groups or an 
individual, through speech intending to intimidate. Some of those sites include 
the Bare Naked Islam site which has a daily forum and chatroom which uses 
hate speech to incite racial hatred and animosity. The hate comments made 
online can have a negative impact on the victims who are targeted and can be 
very upsetting and unsettling for them and their families (Awan, 2014). Below 
is a direct quote from an article by Fiyaz Mughal (2013), the Director for Tell 
MAMA with regards the impact of online anti-Muslim hostility: 
 
Tell MAMA were contacted about four months ago by a young 15-
year-old who explained that her picture had been placed on a 
website without her approval and it transpired that the young girl 
had then received targeted hate tweets and comments because of 
her faith. Her avatar showed a young girl with a hijab on, looking 
rather innocent. Having received anti-Muslim tweets, she 
responded back with some confidence and then extracted herself 
from the conversation. What she subsequently found out was that a 
range of strangers and far right supporters began to make explicit 
comments about her and they posted statements that humiliated 
her faith, her sexuality and aggressively abused her privacy. 
 
This case, which lasted over nine weeks, has had a huge impact on this girl. 
Both the emotional and psychological stress caused to her must not be 
underestimated. Moreover, the fact she was reluctant to report this incident to 
her family because of the social taboo attached had also exacerbated the 
internal pain she was suffering. This case also demonstrates that online 
behaviour can be normalised by offenders, which allows a perpetrator to use 
anonymity, manipulation, and social control to target their victims (Douglas et 
al., 2005). However, while this form of cyber hate often remains ‘‘invisible’’, 
due to offenders deleting tweets and also because the perpetrator can often 
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hide their identity, the offline threat remains very real for victims and their 
families (Hall, 2005).  
 
Understanding the collective impacts of anti-Muslim hostility 
We found that the impacts of anti-Muslim hostility are not restricted to 
individual victims and their families; rather, the harm extends to the wider 
Muslim community (Awan, 2014; Zempi, 2014). In other words, the individual 
fear and vulnerability discussed above is accompanied by the collective fear 
and vulnerability of all Muslims, particularly those individuals who have a 
‘‘visible’’ Muslim identity in the virtual and physical space.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the key characteristics of anti-Muslim hate 
crime is its apparent randomness amongst ‘‘visible’’ Muslims. Drawing on 
Perry’s (2001) seminal work on hate crime, it could be argued that the identity 
of the individual victim is potentially irrelevant as the victim is likely to be 
chosen on the basis of their ‘‘visible’’ membership in the Muslim community 
rather than any individual characteristics. Viewed from this perspective, 
victims are often interchangeable on the premise that they represent the 
Muslim ‘‘Other’’. As Perry (2001) highlights in the context of targeted 
victimization, anti-Muslim hate crime is directed toward the community and not 
simply the individual victim. Correspondingly, the intent of the act is to 
subordinate and intimidate not only the individual victim but also the entire 
community to which the victim belongs. This type of targeted violence can be 
seen as a ‘‘message’’ which is designed to tell the wider Muslim community 
that they are “unwelcome” and ‘‘don’t belong’’, thereby extending the impact 
of this victimization beyond the actual, immediate victim to instill fear in the 
whole of the targeted community (see also Chakraborti and Garland, 2009).  
Throughout interviews and focus group discussions with veiled Muslim 
women, the consensus view amongst participants was that the wider Muslim 
community is under attack by virtue of the fact that ‘an attack on one Muslim 
is an attack on all’ (Zempi, 2014). For Muslims this is a crucial aspect of their 
faith; they are one body in Islam and ‘when any part of the body suffers, the 
whole body feels the pain’. This is demonstrated in the following quotations:  
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You feel it as a whole. Whilst it is an attack on the individual, it’s 
actually an attack on Islam as a whole. Therefore, it has an effect 
on everybody. We talk very much about the ummah, so any part of 
that which is attacked is felt across the whole community. (Layla) 
 
We feel we are all under attack. When it has happened to another 
sister or brother it does affect me. It affects all of us. (Focus group 
participant) 
 
In our religion, we believe we are all one body. If one person is hurt, 
it’s like a part of our body is hurt so we all have to be concerned 
when women in niqabs are at risk. (Focus group participant) 
 
In this sense, anti-Muslim hostility is unique in the consciousness of the wider 
Muslim community through notions of a worldwide, transnational Muslim 
community, the ummah, which connects Muslims in the UK with other 
Muslims throughout the world (see also Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). An 
appreciation of the concept of ummah and its implications has relevance for 
understanding the community impacts of anti-Muslim hostility. In essence, the 
notion of ummah reframes the parameters of what defines national identity in 
Islam, and reflects the development of a robust collective identity amongst the 
world’s Muslims, which cannot be adequately explained exclusively within the 
framework of religious fellowship.  
According to Mandeville (2003, p. 135), ‘Muslims living in diaspora – 
particularly in the West – are of varied and diverse ethnic origins. What links 
them together, however, is a shared sense of identity within their religion, an 
idea most clearly located within the concept of the ummah’. The cumulative 
impacts of anti-Muslim hostility can disrupt notions of safety within the Muslim 
community on the basis that fellow Muslims are equally vulnerable to attacks 
by virtue of their group membership. In addition, the collective impacts of anti-
Muslim hostility reinforce the sense of alienation experienced by members of 
the ummah-based community. At the same time though, it is important to 
challenge any notion of the essentialised Muslim community (Bolognani, 
2007). The reified notion of ummah as a homogeneous religious cluster 
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simplifies the enormous levels of diversity and heterogeneity amongst its 
members, including variations around age, gender, race, ethnicity, language, 
sexual orientation and socio-economic status (Alexander et al., 2007). Indeed, 
an understanding of the different layers of identity surrounding the core 
identity of ummah has significance for understanding the diversity of Muslims’ 
experiences. Clearly there are differences across Muslim communities; 
however, the concept of ummah demonstrates that despite these differences, 
Muslims feel connected through their religious beliefs and therefore their 
collective Muslim identity globally keeps them connected. 
 Indeed, in some instances the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime is so 
‘‘real’’ that it can cause Muslims to change the way that they live their lives. 
For example, some Muslims are driven to adopt western names and pretend 
not to be Muslims at all, whilst others emphasize their Asian-ness in order to 
draw boundaries between themselves and other ‘‘visible’’ Muslims (Afshar, 
2008). In this context, the actual and perceived threat of anti-Muslim hate 
crime acts as a form of ‘‘emotional terrorism’’ in that it segregates and isolates 
Muslims, in terms of restricting their freedom of movement and changing their 
patterns of social interaction, both in the public and virtual sphere. As 
mentioned earlier, the anonymity aspect in cases of online abuse is extremely 
frightening as the perpetrator could be anyone (Gelber, 2011). Equally 
worryingly, the online threats can escalate into the physical space. Thus, the 
affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hostility limits pivotal aspects of 
identity-building, such as using social media as well as visiting friends, going 
to University and attending the mosque. This demonstrates that the fear and 
reality of online and offline anti-Muslim hostility restricts Muslims’ participation 
in society (Bleich, 2011).   
Perry and Alvi (2012) point out that this is not a voluntary choice, but the 
‘‘safe’’ choice. Whether individually or collectively, the reality of online and 
offline anti-Muslim hate crime creates ‘‘invisible’’ boundaries, across which 
members of the Muslim community are not ‘‘welcome’’ to step. The enactment 
of both virtual and physical boundaries impacts upon ‘‘emotional geographies’’ 
in relation to the way in which Muslims perceive the spaces and places 
around and outside their communities of abode (Perry and Alvi, 2012). Rather 
than risk the threat of being attacked, either verbally or physically, many 
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actual and potential victims opt to retreat to ‘‘their own’’ communities. The fear 
of online harassment and physical violence reinforces these offline and online 
boundaries whilst contributing to ongoing withdrawal and isolation. From this 
perspective, anti-Muslim hostility affects the wider society on the basis that it 
isolates and excludes Muslims, thereby creating fear, resentment and mistrust 
of the ‘‘Muslim other’’. The separation of communities based on the ‘‘us-
versus-them’’ binary has created a situation in which both Muslims and non-
Muslims live in fear of each other. This separation prevents ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ 
from interacting with each other and increases fear of engagement on both 
sides. As such, anti-Muslim hostility promotes the notion of ‘‘parallel lives’’ 
both online and offline.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have examined the nature and impacts of both online and 
offline anti-Muslim hate crime. Specifically, we have used our research 
projects as case studies in order to consider the affinity between online and 
offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We found that Muslim women are more 
vulnerable to intimidation, violence and harassment, both online and offline. 
Also, individual experiences of online and/or offline anti-Muslim hostility 
increase feelings of insecurity and vulnerability amongst victims, thereby 
diminishing their sense of belonging, confidence and willingness to integrate 
into society. We also found that for victims and their families, it is often difficult 
to isolate the online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they 
suffer offline. Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the 
virtual and the physical world, especially in the globalised world. 
Correspondingly, victims live in fear because of the possibility of online threats 
materialising in the ‘real world’. This shows that in reality, online/offline 
boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. In addition, we 
considered the collective impacts associated with online/offline anti-Muslim 
hostility through notions of a worldwide, transnational Muslim community, the 
‘‘ummah’’, which connects Muslims from all over world. We argued that 
whether Muslims are targeted online or offline, anti-Muslim hate crime is 
commonly perceived by victims to be an attack on Islam and Muslims as a 
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whole. In this regard, the abuse that individual victims suffer online and/or 
offline is linked to the suffering of Muslims globally through the ummah.  
 
Ultimately, this discussion shows that a multifaceted partnership approach is 
vital when tackling online and offline anti-Muslim hatred. As we have 
discussed, previously hate crime victimisation serves as a visible indicator of 
the motives of the perpetrators. It indicates the perpetrator's bias and 
prejudice, and serves symbolic and instrumental functions for the 
perpetrators. As a result, we argue that a new international and national 
online hate strategy should be adopted, that highlights online and offline anti-
Muslim abuse and ways in which the police can deal with such incidents.  
Furthermore, we argue that by strengthening cyber hate regulation and 
protocols that this could also be used to tackle online and offline threats made 
against people of all backgrounds, including anti-Muslim abuse, and at the 
same time ensuring free speech is protected. Accordingly, the UK government 
and police service must examine all online threats and the links with actual 
offline violence as this could help agencies have a better understanding of 
what they are dealing with. 
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